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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
We are here asked to resolve whether under Pennsylvania 
law a commercial purchaser of a pre-engineered warehouse 
may recover in tort from the manufacturer of the 
warehouse for damage caused to its contents when the 
warehouse collapsed. The district court concluded that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would interpret the 
economic loss doctrine as barring tort recovery in these 
circumstances. We will reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment for the manufacturer and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant 2-J Corporation is a New Jersey 
corporation engaged in retail sales of spas, swimming pools, 
and other recreational equipment. In 1987, 2-J hired 
defendant William E. Tice, III, to construct a building in 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania that would serve as a warehouse 
and provide showroom space for 2-J's inventory. Tice then 
contracted with defendant-appellee Jewell Building 
Systems, a North Carolina corporation, to purchase a pre- 
engineered steel structure to be constructed by Tice on 
2-J's premises. Jewell calls its product a "building in a 
box"; it sent Tice the materials necessary to construct the 
warehouse and a design plan that Tice followed in erecting 
the structure. Tice completed construction of the Jewell 
warehouse for 2-J in December 1987. 
 
2-J used the warehouse until January 17, 1994, when 
the supports for the roof assembly failed, causing a 
catastrophic collapse of the warehouse's roof and exterior 
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walls. The warehouse was destroyed. Inventory and other 
items that 2-J was storing in the warehouse at the time of 
the collapse were also destroyed. Unfortunately for 2-J, the 
five-year warranty on the warehouse had expired over a 
year earlier in November 1992. 
 
Seeking to recover damages for loss of the contents of the 
warehouse, 2-J initiated this action. It asserted negligence 
and strict products liability tort claims against Jewell as 
well as a breach of contract claim based on the warranty. 
Jewell moved for summary judgment, arguing that tort 
recovery was barred by the economic loss doctrine, which 
limits the availability of tort remedies in favor of contract 
law among commercial parties when products fail to 
perform as expected. With respect to 2-J's contract claim, 
Jewell urged that summary judgment was appropriate 
because the warranty had expired by the time the 
warehouse collapsed. The district court agreed with Jewell 
on both points and granted summary judgment. See 2-J 
Corp. v. Tice, 926 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
2-J's complaint had also pled claims against Tice. These 
claims were still pending before the district court following 
its ruling on Jewell's summary judgment motion. On 
September 19, 1996, the parties agreed voluntarily by 
stipulation that all claims against Tice would be dismissed. 
The district court entered an order dismissing the claims 
against Tice on November 25, 1996. 
 
2-J filed a notice of appeal on October 16, 1996, seeking 
review only of the district court's decision to grant Jewell 
summary judgment on the tort claims. Since there was no 
final, appealable order until November 25, 1996, 2-J's 
notice of appeal was premature. However, "a premature 
appeal taken from an order which is not final but which is 
followed by an order that is final may be regarded as an 
appeal from the final order in the absence of a showing of 
prejudice to the other party." Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 
918, 922 (3d Cir. 1977) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 
1988). Jewell does not argue that it was prejudiced in any 
respect by 2-J's premature notice of appeal. Thus, that 
notice became timely upon entry of the district court's order 
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dismissing the claims against Tice, and we have jurisdiction 
to resolve this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. S 1291.1 
 
II. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant 
of summary judgment and over its interpretation of state 
law. See Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1040 (3d Cir. 
1992); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Ins. Co. of 
North America, 724 F.2d 369, 371 (3d Cir. 1983). Summary 
judgment is appropriate only if the record shows no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). 
 
Our task is to predict what the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would do if presented with this case. See U.S. 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 90, 
93 (3d Cir. 1996). "In attempting to forecast state law, we 
must consider relevant state precedents, analogous 
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other 
reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest 
court in the state would decide the issue at hand." Aloe 
Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110, 117 (3d Cir. 
1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In the absence of 
guidance from the state's highest court, we are to consider 
decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts for 
assistance in predicting how the state's highest court would 
rule." Gares v. Willingboro Township, 90 F.3d 720, 725 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 
III. 
 
2-J seeks to recover in tort for damage caused to its 
inventory and other items that were being stored in the 
warehouse at the time the warehouse collapsed. The 
district court predicted that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would interpret the economic loss doctrine as 
barring 2-J's tort claims. We conclude that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction over this diversity action pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1332(a). 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not apply the economic 
loss doctrine to bar recovery in this case. 
 
As it originally developed, the economic loss doctrine 
provided that no cause of action could be maintained in 
tort for negligence or strict liability where the only injury 
was "economic loss"--that is, loss that is neither physical 
injury nor damage to tangible property. See, e.g., Aikens v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. 
1985); see also J.G. Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 
854 n.7 (Pa. 1968), overruled on other grounds, AM/PM 
Franchise Ass'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 
1990). The quintessential economic loss was lost profits. 
When a product purchased by a commercial entity failed to 
perform, that entity's business could be disrupted, resulting 
in loss of customers, sales, and profits. The economic loss 
doctrine precluded recovery in tort from the product's 
manufacturer for these purely economic damages. 
 
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 
Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986), the Supreme Court interpreted 
the economic loss doctrine in the context of federal 
admiralty law as barring recovery in tort to a commercial 
buyer for damage a product does to itself. The plaintiff, a 
time-charterer of a supertanker, sued the manufacturer of 
the supertanker's turbines in tort to recover for damages 
suffered as a result of the turbines' malfunctioning. The 
only damage alleged was to the turbines themselves. The 
Court viewed the case as requiring it to determine whether 
a duty should be imposed on manufacturers to protect 
against commercial products injuring themselves, or 
whether, instead, this was a matter best left to the parties' 
agreements and the realm of contract. The Court decided 
that tort recovery should not be available for harm a 
product causes to itself. "Obviously, damage to a product 
itself has certain attributes of a products-liability claim. 
But the injury suffered--the failure of the product to 
function properly--is the essence of a warranty action, 
through which a contracting party can seek to recoup the 
benefit of its bargain." Id. at 867-68. In the course of 
reaching this conclusion, the East River Court reaffirmed 
that a tort remedy remained available for damage to all 
"other property." Id. at 820. 
 
                                5 
 
 
 
East River constitutes an expansion of the economic loss 
doctrine because it precludes recovery for what is clearly 
physical damage to property, i.e., damage to the product 
itself. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., ___ 
U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1786 (1997). The damage to the 
product is conceptually distinct from the lost profits that 
may follow as a consequence of the product's failure. 
However, the majority of jurisdictions that have considered 
the question have adopted the reasoning of East River and 
now deem damage a product causes to itself to be economic 
loss, non-recoverable in tort. See generally Christopher S. 
D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 
591, 595 (1995). 
 
In the instant case, the district court expanded the 
economic loss doctrine still further. It held that recovery is 
also barred for damage to property that foreseeably may be 
injured if the defective product fails. The court was 
convinced that such property is effectively "integrated" with 
the defective product, so that damage to that property is 
tantamount to damage to the product itself. We do not 
believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt this 
expansion of the economic loss doctrine. 
 
We have previously predicted that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would follow the East River approach to the 
economic loss doctrine. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618-21 (3d Cir. 
1995); King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 
1988). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has made the 
same prediction. See, e.g., REM Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 
563 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. Super. 1989). 
 
An essential aspect of the East River economic loss 
doctrine is that while tort recovery is barred for damage a 
product causes to itself, such recovery is available for 
damage the failing product causes to "other property." See 
476 U.S. at 867, 870. Pennsylvania Superior Court cases 
applying East River have explicitly recognized that the 
economic loss doctrine permits a tort claim for damage to 
such other property. See, e.g., REM Coal, 563 A.2d at 129. 
"Tort product liability theories impose responsibility on the 
supplier of a defective product whenever it causes personal 
injury or damage to other property because this is deemed 
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to be the best way to allocate the risk of unsafe products 
and to encourage safer manufacture and design." Id. 
 
East River provides little guidance on how a court should 
distinguish between damage to "the product," for which tort 
recovery is barred by the economic loss doctrine, and 
damage to "other property," for which tort recovery remains 
available. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has 
instructed on how that distinction should be drawn. In 
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., ___ U.S. ___, 
117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997), the plaintiff was the second 
user/owner of a fishing vessel which had, during the 
plaintiff's ownership, caught fire, flooded, and sunk, all as 
a result of a defective hydraulic system. When the initial 
user/owner had purchased the vessel, it had not been 
equipped for use as a fishing vessel. The initial user/owner 
had added extra equipment to make the vessel adequate for 
this purpose. The question the Court addressed was 
whether the added equipment was part of the "product 
itself" or "other property." Id. at 1785. The Court held that 
the added equipment was "other property" and that the 
economic loss doctrine did not preclude the second 
user/owner from recovering in tort from the vessel's 
manufacturer for damage to that equipment. 
 
In reaching its conclusion in Saratoga Fishing, the Court 
indicated that, for purposes of applying the economic loss 
doctrine, "the product" is no more and no less than 
whatever the manufacturer placed in the stream of 
commerce by selling it to the initial user: 
 
       When a Manufacturer places an item in the stream of 
       commerce by selling it to an Initial User, that item is 
       the "product itself" under East River. Items added to 
       the product by the Initial User are therefore "other 
       property," and the Initial User's sale of the product to 
       a Subsequent User does not change these 
       characterizations. 
 
Id. at 1786. Thus, in the case before it, the product was the 
vessel as sold by the manufacturer to the initial user. Since 
the equipment added by the initial user was not part of "the 
product itself," but instead "other property," a tort remedy 
was available with respect to the damaged equipment. 
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The Saratoga Fishing Court started with the proposition 
that general tort and contract law applicable in the context 
of commercial sales2 characterizes as "other property" both 
property added to a defective product by the initial 
user/owner as well as property used by the initial 
user/owner in connection with the defective product. It 
gave three examples: A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994) (owner of chicken 
farm recovered for chickens killed when the chicken house 
ventilator system failed); United Airlines, Inc. v. CEI 
Industries of Ill., 499 N.E.2d 558 (Ill. 1986) (warehouse 
owner recovered for damages to a building caused by a 
defective roof installed by the defendant); and Nicor Supply 
Ships Assoc. v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 
1989) (ship charterer who added expensive seismic 
equipment to ship recovered for its loss in fire caused by a 
defective engine). Moreover, the Court noted that the 
respondents in Saratoga Fishing acknowledged that "had 
the ship remained in the hands of the Initial User, the loss 
of the added equipment could have been recovered in tort." 
Id. at 1787. 
 
The remainder of the Court's analysis in Saratoga Fishing 
was advanced in support of the proposition that this result 
should be no different--i.e., the manufacturer should have 
no greater immunity with respect to foreseeable damage-- 
as a result of the fortuity that a resale occurred before the 
defective product caused injury. That analysis ultimately 
established the time of sale to the initial user as the critical 
point for determining whether added features are part of 
"the product itself" or "other property."3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Saratoga Fishing, like East River , is an admiralty case. The general 
maritime law applied by the Court is, as it indicated, "an `amalgam of 
traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly 
created rules' drawn from both state and federal sources." Saratoga 
Fishing, 117 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting East River). The Court accordingly 
looked to the general law of tort and contract applicable to commercial 
sales. 
 
3. The Court indicated that the time of sale to the initial user was also 
the critical one for resolving a related, but distinct, issue--whether in 
a 
suit against the supplier of a defective component part incorporated into 
a product sold to the plaintiff, "the product itself" is limited to the 
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In our case, we are not concerned with whether features 
added to a product after the sale to the initial user become 
a part of the "product itself." We are concerned only with 
whether property becomes a part of the product itself solely 
because, after the sale to the initial user, it is foreseeably 
utilized in connection with the owner's use of the product. 
Nevertheless, it seems apparent to us that if thefishing 
equipment foreseeably added to the ship by the initial user 
in Saratoga Fishing did not become a part of the "product 
itself," it necessarily follows that the inventory foreseeably 
stored by the initial user in the warehouse here did not 
become a part of the warehouse itself. Accordingly, we 
believe that the district court's "integration" theory in this 
case is inconsistent with Saratoga Fishing and that it 
follows a fortiori from the holding in Saratoga Fishing that 
2-J can recover for the loss of its inventory and other 
property stored in its warehouse. For the same reasons we 
have predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
would find East River persuasive, we conclude that it would 
find Saratoga Fishing persuasive as well and allow a tort 
recovery in this case.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
component supplied by the defendant. The Court recognized the 
prevailing rule to be that "the product itself" includes all components 
added before the sale to the initial user. Id. at 1788. We so held in King 
v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (3d Cir. 1988), when we 
concluded that the bargain struck in the transaction with the initial user 
"determines his or her economic loss and whether he or she has been 
injured beyond that loss." 
 
4. We are aware that a number of courts in addition to the district court 
we are reviewing have ruled that the economic loss doctrine bars tort 
recovery where the "other property" damaged was always likely to have 
been injured upon the failure of "the product" itself. See, e.g., Dakota 
Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Systems, 91 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. 
1996) (applying North Dakota law); Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 
F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 1994)(applying Michigan law); Wellsboro Hotel Co. v. 
Prins, 894 F. Supp 170 (M.D. Pa. 1995)(applying Pennsylvania law); 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Huls America, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 465, 469 
(E.D. Pa. 1995)(applying Pennsylvania law); Neibarger v. Universal 
Cooperatives, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992)(applying Michigan law). 
However, it is also true that numerous courts have rejected this 
expansion of the economic loss doctrine. See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. 
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Jewell contends that it is improper to view this case as 
turning on the issue of whether the contents of the 
warehouse are "the product" or "other property" for 
purposes of the economic loss doctrine. Indeed, it 
acknowledges that 2-J's inventory is not "the product" as 
normally understood. It insists, however, that the relevant 
issue presented is "one of delineating the proper spheres of 
the law of tort and warranty law." Br. at 9. Jewell chooses 
simply to ignore, however, the fact that East River and 
Saratoga Fishing, after considering the appropriate 
functions of tort and contract recovery, concluded in the 
context of commercial transactions that the proper line to 
be drawn between the spheres of tort and warranty law is 
the line between damage to "the product" and damage to 
"other property." As we have indicated, we are confident 
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would accept the 
rationale of East River and Saratoga Fishing. 
 
IV. 
 
Because we conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would not interpret its economic loss doctrine as 
barring recovery in tort for damage the collapsing 
warehouse caused to contents stored within it, we hold that 
summary judgment should not have been granted to Jewell. 
Thus, we will reverse the district court and remand for 
further proceedings in which 2-J may press its negligence 
and strict liability claims to recover for damage to its "other 
property." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd on other 
grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997); Alliance Imaging, Inc. v. 
Picker Int'l Inc., 1993 WL 76209 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Jet Plastica Industries, 
Inc. v. Goodson Polymers, Inc., 1992 WL 17207 (E.D. Pa. 1992). We find 
the latter cases more persuasive, and, particularly after Saratoga 
Fishing, we are confident that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
not conclude that the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery for 
damage to the contents of a warehouse when the warehouse collapses. 
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